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Introduction
The International Law Commission (ILC or the Commission) has a mandate from
the U.N. General Assembly (the UNGA or the General Assembly) to codify and
progressively develop international law. During most of the ILC’s history, the lion’s
share of its work product took the form of draft articles adopted by the UNGA as the
basis for multilateral conventions. The ILC’s activities received their principal legal
effect during this period through the United Nations treaty-making process, rather than
directly on the basis of the ILC’s analysis of what customary international law (CIL or
custom) does or should require.
In recent decades, however, the ILC has self-consciously limited its efforts to
codify or progressively develop international law in the form of multilateral conventions.
Instead, it has turned to other outputs—such as principles, conclusions, and draft articles
that it does not recommend be turned into treaties. Significantly, the Commission often
claims that these outputs reflect CIL. For example, despite recommending that the
General Assembly not base a treaty on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC
as well as many states and commentators assert that the draft articles largely reflect CIL.
This change in behavior presents a puzzle. If the ILC is still engaged in
codification and progressive development, why has it changed the form of the work it
produces? In this chapter, we argue that increasing political gridlock in the General
Assembly—by which we mean a division of views over the substance of international
norms and lack of enthusiasm for convening multilateral diplomatic conferences—has led
the Commission to modify the form of its work to preserve its influence in shaping the
evolution of international law. More specifically, we argue that the reduced likelihood of
the General Assembly adopting draft articles as treaties closes off the primary mechanism
of ILC influence. In addition, if the UNGA or member states reject an ILC
recommendation that its draft articles become treaties, that rejection may suggest that the
work product does not reflect existing custom—an alternative mechanism of ILC
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influence. To avoid these negative outcomes, we expect the ILC to turn to other outputs
that allow it to continue to influence CIL without the General Assembly’s approval.
This chapter makes three contributions to the study of the ILC and custom. 1 First,
we use principal-agent theory to model the relationship between the General Assembly
and the Commission and how that relationship has evolved over time. Second, drawing
upon a new data set that codes all ILC outputs since 1947, we show that the Commission
began to favor non-treaty outputs beginning in the early 1990s. This followed a decade
when ILC treaty recommendations were not adopted by the UNGA or, if adopted, did not
garner sufficient ratifications for the treaties to enter into force. Third, we argue that the
shift away from draft treaties increases the salience of the methodology that the ILC uses
to enhance its influence when the traditional constraint of UNGA review is unavailable
due to gridlock.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly reviewing
the ILC’s mandate to codify and progressively develop international law. We then use
principal-agent theory to analyze the relationship between the General Assembly and the
Commission. We argue that the ILC chooses the work product that maximizes its
influence among states and other actors, subject to its expectations of how the UNGA
will respond to its work. Our core claim is that, as gridlock in the General Assembly has
limited its ability either to adopt treaties or decisively reject non-treaty outputs, the
Commission has had both the incentive and the discretion to choose other outputs that do
not require General Assembly approval. We proceed to provide empirical support for this
claim, documenting the ILC’s shift away from recommending to the UNGA that draft
articles be adopted as treaties.
After establishing this empirical claim, we explain why methodology acts as a
constraint on the ILC even if it does not similarly limit other actors’ claims about the
content of custom. More specifically, we argue that the methodology that the ILC uses to
prepare non-treaty outputs functions as a de facto substitute for the political blessing
associated with the UNGA’s adoption of draft treaty articles. Adherence to methodology
increases the likelihood that a wider audience—government officials, international
judges, national courts and non-state actors—will accept the ILC’s non-treaty work
products as valid statements of CIL. We thus expect the Commission to select a
methodological approach that it expects will be supported by the audience(s) it hopes to
persuade. We find suggestive evidence of this behavior in the ILC’s recent project on
foreign official immunity. We conclude by identifying what we should expect to observe
in future ILC work if our claims are correct.
1

We are not the first to examine changes in the ILC’s work product over time. Previous studies
that offer a range of normative approaches and illustrations include: Frank Berman, The ILC within the
UN’s Legal Framework: Its Relationship with the Sixth Committee, 49 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 107 (2006);
David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form
and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 857 (2002); Jacob Katz Cogan, The Changing Form of the International
Law Commission’s Work 275, 278-79, in EVOLUTIONS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Robert Virzo & Ivan Ingravallo, eds., 2015); Sean D. Murphy, Codification, Progressive Development, or
Scholarly Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s Work Product 29, in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE (Maurizio Ragazzi ed. 2013).
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Gridlock and its wages
Article 13 of the UN Charter tasks the General Assembly with, among other
things, “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its
codification.” 2 The General Assembly, in turn, has delegated this responsibility to the
ILC in the Statute of the International Law Commission (hereinafter the “ILC Statute” or
the “Statute”). 3 The ILC is therefore an agent of the General Assembly, operating within
both the legal limits and political constraints imposed upon it by that UN body. 4
Principal-agent theory can help explain the changing role of the ILC in the codification
and progressive development of international law. In this section, we analyze the
relationship between the General Assembly and the ILC in light of principal-agent
theory. Our central claim is that the increasing gridlock in the General Assembly over
time has constrained the ILC’s ability to carry out what has historically been its primary
function of drafting treaties. These constraints have led the ILC to look for new ways to
influence the formation and codification of CIL. We demonstrate this claim empirically
with a comprehensive review of how the ILC’s output has changed since its inception in
1947, as well as concrete anecdotes drawn from current efforts to prepare draft articles on
the immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction.
The ILC’s mandate
Mirroring the language in Article 13 of the UN Charter, the ILC Statute charges
the Commission with “the promotion of the progressive development of international law
and its codification.” 5 As a formal matter, the Statute treats progressive development and
codification differently. The Statute defines progressive development as the “preparation
of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law
or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of
states.” 6 Codification, on the other hand, means “the more precise formulation and
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been
extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.” 7 The Statute underscores this
distinction by establishing somewhat different procedures for the ILC to follow
depending on its task. 8

2

UN Charter, art. 13.
Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution
174 (II) of 21 November 1947, as amended by resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3
December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981.
4
Cf. Cogan, supra note 1, at 278-79 (“The ILC’s role, therefore, was to assist States in their
lawmaking function by thoroughly researching and debating topics in need of codification and drafting
texts that could then be used as starting points by States in their treaty negotiations.”).
5
ILC Statute, art. 1(1).
6
Id., art. 15.
7
Id.
8
See id., arts. 16-24. The principal difference is that the procedures for codification focus on
collecting information from governments about state practice and reaching conclusions on the basis of that
practice, while progressive development involves consulting with expert and technical bodies and other
international organizations with relevant expertise.
3
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These definitions are connected to the output the General Assembly expects.
Where the ILC engages in progressive development, the Statute contemplates draft
conventions; where it engages in codification, the ILC is given wider latitude with regard
to the form of its product. More specifically, when engaged in codification the Statute
directs the ILC to submit a report to the General Assembly with a recommendation as to
whether to: (1) take no action; (2) adopt the report; (3) adopt draft articles submitted by
the ILC; or (4) convene a diplomatic conference to negotiate a convention. 9
No matter the task it is engaged in or its final product, however, the Statute
envisions a supervisory role for the General Assembly. Proposals for progressive
development come from the General Assembly, UN members, or other international
organizations. 10 Where codification is concerned, the ILC has leeway to select its own
topics, but it is required both to submit its recommendations for topics to the General
Assembly, and to give priority to requests from the General Assembly. 11 The Statute
mandates an opportunity for UN member states to comment on the ILC’s drafts or
provide information about their practices. 12
Whichever track the ILC chooses, its final product is reported annually to the
General Assembly—in particular the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, which
deals with legal affairs—for review and action. The Sixth Committee considers these
reports each fall. This review of these reports gives states an additional opportunity to
opine on the ILC’s progress and provide input and direction on an ongoing basis. Even
where the Sixth Committee does not formally endorse or reject the ILC’s work product,
member state comments provided on the Commission’s annual reports and after initial
readings of projects implicitly shape the ILC’s activities by indicating the kind of
reception that its final products will receive in the UNGA (and, in the case of proposed
conventions, the likelihood of ratification and entry into force). Ultimately, however, the
General Assembly “has the final say on the disposition of the Commission’s drafts. It
can approve them, send them back for redrafting, or reject them.” 13
Principal-agent theory and the UNGA-ILC relationship
Principal-agent theory helps to understand the relationship between the ILC and
the General Assembly, and in particular how that relationship has changed over time.
The theory, which has been widely applied to the study legal institutions, 14 including
international organizations, 15 builds upon rational-choice theories of domestic and
9

Id., art. 23.
Id., art 16-17.
11
Id., art. 18.
12
Id., arts. 16(h), 17(b), 19.2, & 21.2.
13
H.W. Briggs, The Work of the International Law Commission, 17 JAG J. 56, 80 (1963).
14
See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Randall, Calvert, Mathew McCubbins and Barry Weingast, A
Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989).
15
See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of the Law of International Organizations,
15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 162 (2014); Manfred Elsig, Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization:
Complex Agency and “Missing Delegation,” 17 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 495 (2011); Andrew T. Guzman &
10

4

international politics. It posits that self-interested actors involved in governance and
policymaking—such as voters or legislators at the domestic level, and states at the
international level—delegate power to other actors—such as domestic administrative
agencies or international organizations—to provide benefits that the principals could not
achieve on their own.
Delegating may be desirable for a number of reasons—because the agent can
perform a task more efficiently, has superior knowledge or experience, or because the
principal has limited time or resources. For example, the General Assembly delegated to
the ILC its responsibilities under Article 13 of the UN Charter because of the ILC’s
distinctive expertise in international law. The ILC can draw on its members’ specialized
knowledge and experience to prepare draft texts that more accurately assess existing state
practice and opinio juris. The ILC might also be able to prepare these texts more
efficiently than the General Assembly due to its significantly smaller size and the fact
that its members serve in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of states.
The advantages of delegation are substantial, but they can also entail considerable
costs. In particular, in carrying out their assigned tasks agents may seek to further their
own interests rather than those of the principals. The mechanisms used to deter such
behavior are a central focus of principal-agent theory. These tools can be applied ex ante
(for example, by controlling the appointment of agents and precisely defining their
mandate), contemporaneously (by reviewing agents’ activities and decisions), and ex post
(via reporting requirements, revisions to the terms of the delegation, and, in extreme
cases, sanctions). All of these mechanisms are costly, however. The principal is thus
unlikely to devote the resources required to ensure that an agent is perfectly faithful to the
principal’s charge. 17
16

Numerous provisions of the ILC Statute reveal the mechanisms by which the
General Assembly can influence the Commission and its work. The UNGA is
responsible for electing ILC members (Article 3), proposing topics for its consideration
(Article 16), approving topics submitted by member states and IOs (Article 17),
evaluating draft articles (Article 16, para. (j)), reviewing topics proposed by the
Commission (Article 18), commenting on draft Articles (Article 20), reviewing final
drafts (Article 22), and returning such drafts to the Commission for further consideration
(Article 23). 18 In addition to or instead of these formal oversight mechanisms, the
General Assembly can use informal mechanisms, such as providing feedback on topics
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1693 (2008); Daniel L. Nielson
and Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank
Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003).
16
Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(2008).
17
See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of
Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 347 (1997).
18
JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3
(2000); see also B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE
CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1977) (“the [ILC] is in a
subordinate relationship to the General Assembly” and “subject to [its] supervision and control”).
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the Commission has proposed, to exercise de facto oversight over the ILC.
Characterizing the UNGA-ILC relationship as one of principal and agent does
not, however, imply that the Commission does or should merely carry out the General
Assembly’s wishes. To the contrary, principal-agent theory, which assumes that agents
have their own preferences, is fully compatible with international delegations that give
agents broad independence and discretion. “Far from presupposing that agents slavishly
follow the preferences of their principals, PA [principal-agent] analyses give us a
theoretical language for problematizing and generating testable hypotheses about the
sources and the extent of agents’ autonomy and influence.” 19
Nearly seven decades of codification and progressive development work, which
we describe in detail below, reveal how the Commission’s independence, expertise and
discretion operate in practice. The Sixth Committee and the General Assembly have
frequently approved the draft articles and other legal texts that the Commission has
prepared with relatively little modification. But not always. In 1953, for example, when
the ILC urged the adoption of draft articles on the Continental Shelf and High Seas
Fisheries, “the General Assembly declined to comply with the Commission's
recommendation” and directed it to prepare a comprehensive text on the law of the sea. 20
Five years later, the ILC produced a draft Convention on Model Rules on Arbitration
Procedures. “The U.N. General Assembly rejected the draft and merely took note of these
‘Model Rules,’ which were never implemented.” 21 Similarly, ILC’s work in preparing
the U.N. Watercourses Convention “was not linear: different approaches were tested and
some were rejected, in part as a result of information received through the annual
interaction between the Commission and the U.N. General Assembly.” 22 These examples
reveal that the UNGA was not merely a rubber stamp for the ILC’s work.
That the instances of outright UNGA rejection are few suggests that the
Commission is highly adept at performing the expert tasks entrusted to it by the ILC
Statute. But such a pattern is also consistent with an agent operating in the shadow of
what it anticipates the principal will accept. As Jeffrey Morton has explained:
[T]he commission generally seeks to ascertain rules which are likely to be
useful to states in the conduct of their relations, bears in mind what rules
and formulations states are likely to agree to and, on the basis of its
19

Mark Pollack, Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red Herrings,
Theoretical Clarifications, and Empirical Disputes, Bruges Political Research Papers No. 2, at 5-6 (Feb.
2007); see also CARMEN PAVEL, DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIMITS
OF STATE AUTHORITY 54 (2015) (“nothing in the principal-agent model entails a dominating relationship”).
Agents with extensive independence, such as international courts, are often referred to as “trustees.” E.g.,
Manfred Elsig and Mark Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial
Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391 (2014).
20
Briggs, supra note 13, at 58.
21
Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 70 (1997).
22
Stephen C. McCaffrey, The 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention: Retrospect and Prospect, 21
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 165, 166 (1997).
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assessment of these two questions, proceeds to examine and deal with
each topic. The pragmatic approach of the [ILC] limits, to a large degree,
both the sources and subjects of international law that are considered
legitimate. 23
As the conditions under which the principals’ review and control of agents change,
however, so to do the activities and decisions undertaken by the agents, especially those
whose mandate gives them a high degree of autonomy.
Expected ILC behavior under conditions of increasing UNGA gridlock
As we have explained, principal-agent relationships give agents a range of
discretion to act independently. The degree of discretion is a function of the terms of the
delegation and the principal’s supervision costs. As supervising the agent becomes more
costly, the principal is less likely to do so. As such costs decline, an agent becomes more
constrained. It follows that changes in the principal’s supervision costs can result in shifts
in the relationship between the principal and the agent.
The principal’s decision-making rules are a key determinant of its supervision
costs. In collective bodies, such as the General Assembly, rejecting action by the ILC
requires the affirmative vote of no more than a majority of voting members. Where a
body operates by consensus, as the UNGA Sixth Committee does in practice, 25 as few as
one dissenting vote can result in rejection. Moreover, the ILC may self-discipline, even
without a formal vote, where a minority of states strongly opposes a particular proposal. 26
These decision rules raise the cost of supervision, but they tend to remain constant over
time. 27 Supervision costs do increase, however, in response to a rise in the number of
members of a collective body and in the heterogeneity of their preferences. We thus
expect that as the UNGA becomes larger and more diverse, and as its members’ views on
particular international law topics diverge, its costs of supervising the ILC will also rise.
24

These insights help to explain changes in how the ILC has pursued its delegated
task of codifying and progressively developing international law. The ILC’s influence
depends on the extent to which states and other actors accept and follow the legal
instruments it promulgates. As explained above, the ILC Statute presents the Commission
with a basic choice that shapes its ability to maximize this influence. The ILC can seek to
have its work adopted by the General Assembly and, ultimately, states as a treaty.
Alternatively, it can submit other work products—such as “principles” or
23

MORTON, supra note 18, at 2-3 (discussing RAMCHARAN, supra note 18).
Other supervision costs include the cost of informing oneself about the agent’s actions.
25
See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Approving 16 Draft Resolutions, Legal Committee
Continues Tradition of Consensus in Session’s Final Debate, GA/L/3473 (Nov. 15, 2013).
26
We are grateful to Sean Murphy for this point.
27
Similarly, the time and effort devoted to analyzing the ILC’s annual reports—which can run to
300 pages, cover a wide range of legal issues, and must done in the two-month period between the ILC’s
submission of the report and the debate in the Sixth Committee—represents a supervision cost. These costs
may have risen over time to the extent that the length of reports has increased, an issue outside the scope of
this chapter.
24
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“conclusions”—or it can prepare draft articles without recommending that the UNGA
adopt them as a treaty. These latter outputs resemble restatements of U.S. law. They
synthesize, memorialize, and sometimes shift the meaning of existing international rules,
but the instrument itself does not take on legally binding status. Critically, turning the
ILC’s final product into a treaty requires affirmative approval by the General
Assembly 28 —something that becomes less likely as gridlock increases. The ILC’s
“restatements,” however, can influence CIL without UNGA action. For example, states
and international tribunals may cite the ILC’s work as authoritative, as has often occurred
for the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. To be sure, the General Assembly retains
the power to disapprove of the Commission’s non-treaty outputs. But under conditions of
gridlock, such disapprovals will be rare.
We thus expect the ILC to choose the form of work product that maximizes its
influence among states, subject to its expectations of how the UNGA will respond to its
work. We are not alone in this making claim. As David Caron has argued, “it is entirely
proper for the ILC to consider the endgame of its work product, and to take account of
possible dysfunctions in the state system generally or relating to a particular topic.” 29 To
our knowledge, however, we are the first to put forward a theory of ILC influence using
principal-agent theory.
Specifically, we expect the ILC to recommend that the General Assembly adopt
its draft articles as a treaty if it believes the treaty is likely to be adopted and enter into
force. The political endorsement of the ILC’s work by the UNGA that comes with the
treaty-making process makes subsequent adherence by states more likely, all else equal.
Similarly, the markers of state acceptance that accompany treaty ratifications remove the
uncertainty as to the existence and scope of a legal obligation that often accompany CIL.
By contrast, as gridlock increases the likelihood of General Assembly inaction,
we expect the ILC to turn to other legal outputs. This enhanced risk of inaction could
flow from political polarization within the General Assembly. Alternatively, it could be
the result of the ILC considering issues on which states have more heterogeneous
preferences. Arguably, the ILC’s current work program includes topics that are more
difficult than its earlier work codifying, for example, the law of treaties or diplomatic
relations.
The causes of polarization do not affect our prediction, however. Rather, our
focus is only on the effects of UNGA polarization—whatever its causes—on ILC
behavior. Specifically, we predict that polarization increases the probability of inaction
by the UNGA. Inaction, in turn, induces the ILC to increase the influence of its outputs
28

Although creating international obligations via a treaty ultimately requires states individually
consent to the agreement, the adoption of a treaty by an international organization or diplomatic conference
is a critical prior step. Adoption represents a collective decision by the member states to proceed with the
instrument. Adoption gives all member states—including those that have no intention of signing or
ratifying the agreement—the chance to decide whether the treaty will even be opened for signature, as well
as to influence its content. See Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern
International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559 (2014).
29
Caron, supra note 1, at 866.
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through means other than General Assembly approval. Restatements, principles, and
other non-binding codifications of particular international law topics allow the ILC to
achieve this result.
In sum, principal-agent theory leads us to predict that the ILC—an institution that
seeks to influence the content of international law—will have greater control over the
form and content of its work product as the likelihood of gridlock and inaction in the
General Assembly rises. If the Commission expects to the UNGA to approve its work, we
expect the ILC to prefer the treaty-making route. In contrast, if it expects that gridlock
will prevent a treaty’s adoption, the ILC will seek other pathways to enhance its
influence. As we explain below, the historical record provides support for our claim,
revealing that the ILC has shifted over time from treaty-making to “restatements” and
other non-treaty outputs.
The shift from treaties to non-binding codifications
For most of its history, the ILC has submitted draft articles to the General
Assembly with a recommendation that the articles form the basis for a convention. 30 This
preference for proposing treaties reflects, in part, the fact that the distinction between
codification and progressive development has been elusive in practice. 31 As Hersch
Lauterpacht has written:
[T]here is very little to codify if by that term is meant no more than giving,
[in the language of ILC statute Article 15], precision and systematic order
to rules of international law . . . once we approach at close quarters
practically any branch of international law, we are driven, amidst some
feeling of incredulity, to the conclusion that although there is as a rule a
consensus of opinion on broad principle . . . there is no semblance of
agreement in relation to specific rules and problems. 32
Most topics that the ILC undertakes involve a mix of identifying abstract rules on
which states agree (codification) and attempting to propose solutions about rules on
which they do not agree (progressive development). 33 Because the distinction has been
difficult to maintain in practice, the ILC in its first half-century usually opted for treaties
as the preferred outcome, generally eschewing the “reports” and other outputs that the
ILC Statute contemplates when the Commission is engaged in codification. The political
blessing that came with recommending treaties papered over the question of whether the
draft articles were in fact CIL supported by state practice and opinio juris (as required for
codification).

30

See Cogan, supra note 1, at 278.
Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1008 (2012).
32
Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 16 ,
17 (1955).
33
Meyer, supra note 31, at 1008 (arguing that in practice “codification has been an exercise in
identifying areas of custom and attempting to fill in the gaps.”).
31
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Table 1 below 34 illustrates the dominance of treaty recommendations prior to the
turn of the century. It displays three sets of data: (1) the number of projects completed in
roughly each third of the ILC’s existence, classifying projects into time periods based on
the date the ILC completed the project; (2) the ILC’s recommendation as to whether to
pursue a treaty; and (3) whether a treaty has in fact entered into force. Between 1947 and
1999, the Commission’s consistent practice was to “recommend to the General Assembly
the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the draft articles.” 35 During that period,
the ILC completed 30 projects. The ILC concluded 20 of those projects by
recommending a convention. By and large, the General Assembly collectively, and states
individually, agreed. 14 of the 20 recommended conventions were adopted and have
entered into force—a success rate of 70%. This success rate is even higher in the first
twenty-five years of the Commission’s work, from 1949-1974. During that period the
Commission recommended 14 conventions out of 21 completed projects. 12 of those 14
entered into force, for a success rate of 86% (see Table 1).
Table 1

Projects Completed
Convention Recommended
Convention recommended and in
Force
Success Rate

1947-1999
30

19471974
21

20

14

6

2

14

12

2

0

70%

86%

33%

0%

1975-1999 2000-2014
9
12

The twenty-first century, by contrast, has seen the ILC shift away from work
products that are intended to become treaties. From 2000 to 2014, the Commission
completed 12 projects. Of those, it recommended a treaty in only two instances—the
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, and Diplomatic
Protection. As of March 2015, the UNGA had not adopted either recommendation—a
success rate of 0%. 36
Figure 1 reproduces the data in a graphical format with two additions—the
number of projects for which the Commission did not recommend a treaty, and
discontinued projects. Figure 1 illustrates the stark decline in recommended treaties and
the concomitant rise in outputs that the Commission does not contemplate becoming
34

The tables and figures in this section are based on authors’ coding of all ILC outputs since 1947.
The coding is based on data obtained from a four-volume treatise that comprehensively analyzes the
Commission’s work. ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1949-1998 (1999) (3 vols.);
MICHAEL WOOD & ARNOLD PRONTO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, 1999-2009 (2011). More
recent information was obtained from the ILC website, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.
35
ILC Statute, art. 13.
36
The UNGA adopted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State in 2004. However,
the ILC completed its work on jurisdictional immunities in 1991, and thus we include this project in the
1974-1999 period.
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treaties. Since 1975 the Commission has proposed a total of eight treaties, of which only
two are in force—a 25% success rate (see Figure 1). In contrast, over two-thirds of ILC
projects ending in the same period, including discontinued topics, concluded without the
ILC recommending a treaty (17 of 25, or 68%). This percentage rises to a striking 85%
(11 of 13) for projects ending between 2000 and 2014.

Figure 1
14
12

Convention in force

10

Convention recommended but not
in force

8

Convention not recommended

6

Topic Discontinued

4

N=47

2
0

1949-1974 n=22

1975-1999 n=12

2000-2014 n=13

A more fine-grained look at our dataset of ILC outputs sheds light on the
interaction between the General Assembly’s behavior and the Commission’s
recommendations. In the 1980s, the Commission completed only three projects (see
Figure 2). In each instance, the ILC recommended a convention, and in each instance the
proposed convention failed to enter into force. 37 While the number of observations is too
small to draw firm conclusions, the small number of projects completed—and their
lukewarm reception from states—suggests that the ILC may have concluded that it could
no longer expect to influence the evolution of international law via treaty proposals.
Figure 2 reveals that the slow pace of the Commission’s work continued through
1990s, a decade during which the ILC completed five projects, recommending
conventions in only three instances. Of those three, only two have entered into force. But
the way in which they have done so is suggestive of dissensus among states even when
the General Assembly adopts a draft treaty. The Convention on the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, for example, was adopted in 1997 but only obtained
the minimum necessary 35 ratifications in 2014.

37

The two conventions adopted by the UNGA that did not enter into force are State Succession in
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Given this declining success rate, it is hardly surprising that the ILC has turned
almost exclusively to non-treaty outputs. Perhaps the most prominent example of this
shift is the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The ILC adopted the draft
articles in 2001 and submitted them to the General Assembly with a recommendation
only that the UNGA “take note” of the draft articles. This recommendation followed
guidance from a number of countries (including China, Japan, and the United Kingdom,
and the United States) that, in the words of Special Rapporteur James Crawford, worried
that states would not:
see it in their interests to ratify an eventual treaty, rather than relying on
particular aspects of it as the occasion arises. They [the countries opposing
a draft treaty based on the ILC’s draft articles] note the destabilizing and
even “decodifying” effect that an unsuccessful convention may have. In
their view it is more realistic, and is likely to be more effective, to rely on
international courts and tribunals, on State practice and doctrine to adopt
and apply the rules in the text. These will have more influence on
international law in the form of a declaration or other approved statement
than they would if included in an unratified and possibly controversial
treaty. 38
As Crawford makes clear, divisions among states made the adoption and entry
into force of a convention on state responsibility unlikely. Given this fact, the ILC had to
consider how to enhance the influence of its work. Bypassing the treaty-making process
was deemed the best approach, both because it denied states the opportunity to formally
express disagreement with aspects of the draft articles and because it opened other
avenues—the disaggregated and relatively uncoordinated actions of states and
38
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international tribunals and organizations—for the ILC’s work to gain traction. 39
More recently, other conflicts have arisen in the General Assembly regarding ILC
outputs. In its 2013 end of year review of the Commission’s work, a number of states in
the Sixth Committee challenged the form of two sets of draft articles—on Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities and on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. The United
States, for example, argued that both texts “went beyond the present state of international
law and practice . . . [and] were designed as resources to encourage national and
international action in specific contexts, rather than to form the basis of a global treaty.
Therefore, [the United States] expressed support for retaining them in their current
form.” 40 Similarly, in discussing the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, Bahrain
(on behalf of the Arab Group) called for more scientific research on the topic and further
study of state practice before the draft articles could be turned into a treaty. 41
The Commission’s ongoing projects continue this trend towards non-binding
codifications. Because the ILC has not yet made a recommendation to the General
Assembly regarding these projects, we omit them from the data reported in Figures 1 and
2. Nevertheless, the Commission already appears committed to pursuing non-binding
codifications in its current projects on the Identification of Customary International
Law 42 and the Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice in relation to the
Interpretation of Treaties, 43 both of which will result in “conclusions.” Moreover, the
project on the Protection of the Atmosphere is likely to end in non-binding
“Guidelines,” 44 while the ILC’s second study of the most-favored nation clause will
conclude with just a report. 45
One ongoing project for which the Commission is preparing draft articles—the
immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction (foreign official immunity)—
provides an especially apt example of how disagreement in the General Assembly can
stall treaty-making in the ILC. 46 The Commission added foreign official immunity to its
work program in 2006. Its work began in earnest with the appointment of Roman
Kolodkin of Russia as the Special Rapporteur. During his tenure in that position,
Kolodkin wrote three reports on the immunity of state officials: a Preliminary Report in
2008, 47 a Second Report in 2010, 48 and a Third Report in 2011. 49 In 2012, with
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See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 66-76, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014).
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45
See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n ¶¶ 262-64, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014).
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Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l
Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/601 (May 29, 2008) (by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin).
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Kolodkin’s departure from the ILC, the Commission appointed a new Special
Rapporteur, Concepcion Escobar Hernandez. To date, Escobar Hernandez has produced a
Preliminary Report, 50 a Second Report, 51 and a Third Report. 52 Additionally, Escobar
Hernandez proposed several draft articles in connection with her Second and Third
Reports. The Commission referred these articles to the drafting committee. After some
modifications by the drafting committee, the ILC Plenary adopted the draft articles. 53
Two related issues have animated debates within the ILC on foreign official
immunity. The first is the scope of, and any exceptions to, the immunity of foreign
officials. The second is the extent to which the Commission should engage in codification
versus progressive development. Kolodkin, the first Special Rapporteur, generally
favored codifying existing state practice—an approach that many members of the
Commission indicated would result in broad immunity for foreign officials. Escobar
Hernandez’s approach was different. Following the suggestion of many members who
were critical of Kolodkin’s reports, Escobar Hernandez indicated that she did not intend
to undertake a codification exercise limited to extant custom, but would include elements
of progressive development as well. 54 She also stressed the need to base the
Commission’s work on “the current values of the international community.” 55
The sharp divisions and strongly held beliefs on these questions are also apparent
in the General Assembly’s review of the ILC’s work. State representatives have taken
conflicting positions on virtually every key issue with which the Commission is
grappling, making it difficult to prepare draft articles that are likely to win favor in the
General Assembly. For example, on the question of codification versus progressive
development, several delegates urged the Commission to focus on “reviewing and
summarizing relevant practices and rules” of immunity instead of establishing new
immunity rules. 56 By contrast, others urged the Commission to follow Escobar
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Immunity for Broader Range of State Officials, GA/L/3448 (Nov. 5, 2012); see also Press Release, U.N.
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Hernandez’s recommendation that the Commission consider the issue from both the
perspective of lex lata and lex ferenda. 57 States also divided on the scope of official
immunity. Some delegations, like Greece and South Korea, urged the Commission to
include exceptions to immunity for the most serious international crimes. 58 African
countries such as Kenya and Algeria expressed greater skepticism that state practice
supported such exceptions. 59 Delegations similarly took opposing views on what the
outcome of the ILC’s process should be, with some suggesting a binding treaty and
others urging a non-binding instrument. 60
The most telling example of the gridlock within the General Assembly on foreign
immunity questions, however, is not what state representatives have said about the ILC’s
work on foreign official immunity. Rather, it is the fact that the General Assembly has
initiated its own parallel investigation into the topic of universal jurisdiction—an issue
that is inextricably linked to the immunity of foreign officials from domestic criminal
prosecution. The General Assembly took up this investigation at the urging of Tanzania,
which in July 2009 submitted a request to include “the subject and scope of universal
jurisdiction” on the General Assembly’s agenda. 61 In so doing, Tanzania acted on behalf
of the African Group, which had previously adopted a resolution calling for
“exhaustive[]” discussions at the U.N. in response to the indictments “issued in some
European States against African leaders.” 62 The Tanzanian request noted similar
concerns, including the “ad hoc and arbitrary application [of the principle], particularly
towards African leaders.” 63
The General Assembly assigned the matter to the Sixth Committee—the same
body which reviews the ILC’s work. 64 In meetings in 2009 and 2010, State
representatives expressed widely divergent views, with a number expressly linking
GAOR, Natural Disaster Relief Draft Articles Need Clearer Parameters, Argue Delegates as Legal
Committee Continues Review of International Law Commission Report, GA/L/3447 (Nov. 2, 2012).
57
Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Natural Disaster Relief Draft Articles Need Clearer Parameters,
Argue Delegates as Legal Committee Continues Review of International Law Commission Report,
GA/L/3447 (Nov. 2, 2012) (for example, the Austrian representative urged that “the starting point must be
the identification of existing norms of international law, followed by possible progressive development in
accordance with the present needs of the international community.”).
58
Press Release, U.N. GAOR, As Review of International Law Commission Report Continues,
Legal Committee Tackles Definitions, Interpretations of Draft Texts, GA/L/3466 (Oct. 29, 2013).
59
Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Immunity of State Officials Remains at Issue as Committee Ends
Review of International Law Commission Report, GA/L/3428 (Nov. 4, 2011).
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Id.
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Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Doc. Assembly/AU/11 (XIII)
at ¶¶ 3, 4 (Jul. 3, 2009).
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Press Release, U.N. GAOR, Sixth Committee, Legal Committee Delegates See Principle of
Universal Law as Safeguard Against Impunity for Major Crimes; Some Caution on Risk of Abuse,
GA/L/3371 (Oct. 20, 2009) [2009 Sixth Committee Meeting].
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universal jurisdiction to the scope of foreign official immunity. Delegates from African
and Asian countries stressed that the application of universal jurisdiction must be
consistent with the principles of sovereign and foreign official immunity. 65 In contrast,
delegates from Europe and Latin America generally praised universal jurisdiction as a
backstop to other national prosecutions and a tool to prevent impunity for international
crimes.
In subsequent years, delegates have debated the appropriate division of labor
between the Sixth Committee and the ILC. These debates reveal a wide dissensus among
member states and suggest the likelihood of gridlock should the ILC recommend a treaty
based on draft articles. Several delegates called for referring the universal jurisdiction
agenda item to the Commission for further study, stressing “the fundamentally juridical
and technical nature of the subject.” 66 Others opined that “[b]ecause the Committee was
a political body and the [ILC] an expert one, it was more appropriate for the Commission
to study the topic further.” 67 In further discussions in 2013, Uganda’s representative
echoed this sentiment, asking “If not in this forum [the UNGA’s Sixth Committee], then
where?” 68
The disagreements in the General Assembly over foreign official immunity and
universal jurisdiction have sent conflicting signals to the ILC. On the one hand, state
views on the scope of immunity are polarized. Perhaps for this reason, the Commission
has to date deferred difficult questions about whether exceptions to immunity exist. At
the same time, the General Assembly has opened another front on a closely-related issue.
Not only have similar divisions among states emerged in the Sixth Committee’s
discussion of universal jurisdiction. The practice of forum shopping within the General
Assembly as a means of fracturing opinion, rather than building consensus in favor of a
single approach, has called into question the reception the ILC’s work will receive. In
sum, this example illustrates the dangers of trying to win consensus on a treaty, and the
advantages for the Commission of looking beyond the General Assembly to find an
audience for its work.
The renewed importance of customary international law methodology
Our primary claim in this chapter is that gridlock in the UNGA affects the ILC’s
choice of work product. In this section, we make a second claim: that the shift away from
preparing draft treaties increases the salience of the methodology that the ILC uses to
enhance its influence. As the ILC’s ability to promulgate texts that will be adopted as
65
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treaties narrows, the Commission has an increased interest in having states and other
actors accept its non-binding texts as CIL. Yet, these actors may have doubts about the
persuasive value of ILC texts that lack the General Assembly’s blessing. Adherence to a
methodology can alleviate these worries by providing an alternative mechanism to limit
the ILC’s discretion when the traditional constraint of UNGA review is unavailable due
to gridlock. The Commission can use the constraints of methodology, in other words, to
persuade other actors that its non-treaty outputs possess the properties of rulelegitimacy—determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence—that Thomas
Franck famously identified. 69 But what methodology has this effect? The traditional
sources of CIL are one plausible choice. At the same time, the ILC may wish to adopt
approaches that give it relatively more discretion.
In what follows, we first discuss the rising importance of methodology as a
constraint on the ILC. We then explore the new light that methodology sheds on the
sources the Commission has used in its ongoing codification of the law of foreign official
immunity.
Can methodology constrain the ILC?
At the outset, we confront the question of whether CIL methodology matters at
all. As much scholarship has emphasized, the traditional test for CIL is plagued by
indeterminacy. This indeterminacy, in turn, has led scholars to question whether
methodology does any work in shaping the content of the CIL. In her contribution to this
volume, Monica Hakimi writes that “because the CIL process is so unstructured, it lacks
the formal controls that might inhibit the participants from pushing hard for their
preferred norms—making the opportunistic claims that methods for finding CIL try to
weed out.” 70 And as Curtis Bradley suggests in his analysis of the adjudication of CIL,
the content of custom is determined by a process analogous to the common law, in which
judges make choice that are shaped by “assessments of state preferences as well as social
and moral considerations.” 71 If the preferences of states, judges and other actors about
substantive norms are all that matter, methodology would appear to exert little if any
force in constraining competing claims about the content of CIL.
We disagree with these approaches, at least as applied to the ILC’s articulation of
custom. To be clear, we are not saying that the methodology the ILC adopts will produce
determinate answers in all, or even in many, circumstances. But a methodology does not
have to produce determinate answers in order to narrow the set of claims that actors may
make about the content of rules. 72 Our claim is thus a more modest one: the methodology
that the ILC uses to identify custom limits the set of rules that the Commission can
69
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plausibly advance to influence the content of CIL through non-treaty outputs. To be sure,
the ILC retains discretion in interpreting what custom requires, but that discretion is
limited by how faithfully the Commission adheres to the methodology it espouses.
Indeed, as we explain below, expert bodies like the ILC are more constrained by
methodology than are other international actors.
The following thought experiment helps to illustrate these points. If method
exerted no constraining influence whatsoever, the Commission could simply submit a list
of proposed rules to the UNGA, perhaps backed by policy justifications. The rules’
success would not need to be justified in terms of practice (state or otherwise), opinio
juris, or other claims to legality, and we would not expect the ILC or other actors to
spend any time canvassing these sources or couching their arguments in those terms. In
reality, however, we do see actors, and especially the ILC, discussing CIL in terms of
doctrine.
Consistency in adhering to a methodology is also in the Commission’s selfinterest. When the ILC engages in progressive development, it is not limited to
examining the two traditional requisites of custom—widespread and extensive state
practice and opinio juris. It is instead free to advance proposals for new international
rules or extensions of existing rules that have yet to garner general support from states.
For codification, in contrast, the Statute contemplates reliance on “extensive State
practice, precedent and doctrine,” an arguably stricter evidentiary standard that imposes
somewhat greater constraints on the ILC’s norm generating activities.
As we explained in the previous section, the ILC in its early years demonstrated a
preference for draft articles that it anticipated would be approved by the UNGA as
multilateral treaties. This choice of work product gave the Commission relatively wide
discretion to support draft texts with whatever evidence was available—whether or not
that evidence was sufficient, or even relevant, to prove an existing custom—and to elide
the often abstruse distinction between codification and progressive development. 73 Yet
the ILC exercised this discretion in the shadow of UNGA review. If its members strayed
too far from what the political winds would bear, they risked having the draft articles
rejected or returned for further study and revision.
In response to increasing gridlock in the UNGA and pressure to take on more
unsettled or contentious topics, the ILC has shifted to work products that do not
contemplate the adoption of new conventions. Crucially, as explained above, these more
malleable outputs—unlike the Commission’s progressive development work—do not
require formal approval by the UNGA to influence the content of international law
(although such approval is of course desirable). Yet because these work products are
generated pursuant to the ILC’s delegated authority to codify extant custom rather than
extend the law in new directions, their influence with other international and domestic
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actors depends upon the extent to which the Commission supports its proposals with
persuasive evidence that a putative custom in fact exists.74
Seen from this perspective, the methodology that the ILC employs to create its
work product may function as a de facto substitute for the political blessing traditionally
associated with the UNGA’s adoption of draft articles and preparation of multilateral
conventions. That is, under conditions of UNGA gridlock, the Commission’s choice of
the codification track gives it greater discretion to select its preferred output (principles,
conclusions, freestanding draft texts, and so forth), minimizing the possibility of rebuke
or sanction from a hamstrung UNGA. Yet if those outputs are in fact to influence
international law through uptake by actors other than the UNGA, the ILC must convince
those actors that the methodology it employs to produce those outputs is itself valid. The
need to persuade these actors serves as a check on the ILC that cabins its discretion to
shape the content of international rules. In Franck’s terms, the ILC gives its non-treaty
outputs legitimacy through adherence to methodology, because the legitimacy available
through the political approval process is foreclosed.
Significantly, the Commission’s use of methodology as a mechanism of
persuasion need not apply to other actors who advance claims about CIL. Some bodies
may enjoy such widespread legitimacy and political support that they need not adhere to
a particular methodology in order to have their pronouncements followed. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which makes claims about customary
international humanitarian law (IHL), may provide an example of this kind of institution.
As Hakimi says, the ICRC’s studies have had broad influence on customary IHL even
though the extent to which they accurately reflect custom is contested. 75 Well-established
and widely respected tribunals, such as the German Constitutional Court or the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, provide another example. 76
By contrast, institutions in newly emerging or fragile democracies—such as the
U.S. Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century, Eastern European courts in the
1990s, intellectual property agencies in the Andean Community in the late 1980s—must
develop legitimacy over time. 77 One strategy for doing so is to apply methodology evenhandedly to a range of problems. Developing a reputation for applying methodology
consistently may insulate a judicial, administrative, or other expert body from claims that
it is simply resolving distributive conflicts in accordance with its (or some other actor’s)
74
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preferences. 78 Adherence to methodology, in other words, can enhance the influence of
an institution seeking to garner widespread legitimacy.
This is true as well for the ILC under conditions of UNGA gridlock. Of course,
the Commission has been codifying and progressively developing CIL for decades and,
as a result, has built a reputation as a highly respected expert body. But that expertise—
and the discretion that comes with it—was developed in light of certain expectations
about the review of its work by U.N. political bodies. With the membership of those
bodies increasingly divided, the opportunity for meaningful review has diminished. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that the Commission would turn to other
mechanisms—in particular methodology—as a way to maintain and even expand its
influence under very different circumstances.
The role of methodology in the ILC’s recent work
The ILC thus has an interest in adhering to a methodology in how it pursues its
work. That methodology, however, need not be the traditional inquiry into state practice
and opinio juris. Rather, the Commission may augment its influence by consistently
employing an approach that deviates from the traditional mode of identifying CIL. We
consider that possibility here.
At first blush, the idea of tinkering with methodology to expand discretion and
broaden influence may seem inconsistent with the idea of using methodology as a
constraint. Although there is undeniably a tension, the two approaches are not
incompatible. A judge, for example, may select a preferred method of constitutional
interpretation because she believes it reaches results that accord most of the time with her
preferred interpretation of the law. Yet to maintain credibility with litigants and other
actors, the judge may still feel compelled to adhere to that methodology even in cases in
which it produces a result the judge does not like.
More specifically, we expect the ILC to select and, relatively consistently, adhere
to a methodological approach aimed at attracting the support of the audience it hopes to
persuade. Actors who are convinced by a strict approach to codification outside of treatymaking will be most convinced by ILC work products that closely adhere to the
traditional requisites of custom. If this view predominates, we would expect the
Commission to carefully investigate all potentially relevant sources of custom—including
affirmative state practice by specially affected countries, acquiescence by other nations,
and evidence and inferences of opinio juris. The ILC may even solicit the views of
governments to bolster its findings based on these traditional sources. 79
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On the other hand, executive branch officials are acutely aware that both their
actions and their utterances in international law-related venues will be scrutinized for any
hints about the existence or emergence of custom. They may, as a result, be reluctant to
express a position that could later be used against them and instead couch their statements
in deliberately vague or ambiguous language. To the extent that the Commission sticks
to the canonical test for CIL, this reticence creates a challenge for the ILC’s ability to
make claims about extant custom. Similarly, the rise of countries such as India and
China, and their growing willingness and capacity to contest the emergence of new
customary norms contrary to their interests, 80 makes establishing the veneer of a
“consistent state practice” all the more difficult, precisely because more states may seek
to prevent a consensus about a putative legal rule from emerging.
If traditional indications of state practice and opinio juris are scarce or conflicting,
the Commission may seek to expand the sources and materials it considers beyond those
that states can manipulate directly. By giving weight to sources such as international and
national court decisions, expert studies, resolutions of international organizations, and the
Commission’s own past work, the ILC can expand its ability to prepare codificationrelated work products not supported by canonical evidence of custom. Moreover, since
the actors who can informally bless these outputs are not limited to states, concerns about
deviating from a strict approach to custom may be reduced. This methodological move
may thus liberate the ILC from some of the constraints imposed by conflicting state
practice or political factions.
The ILC’s study of foreign official immunity provides more support for the latter
position—that the ILC relies today on evidence beyond canonical state practice and
opinio juris—than the former. The Kolodkin and Escobar Hernandez reports—and the
heated debates they engendered—do not contain detailed, country-by-country analyses of
state practice as expressed, for example, in official government actions or
pronouncements regarding immunity rules or their exceptions. The documents and
discussions evince even less treatment of opinio juris. To the extent that traditional
indicia of custom are referenced at all, they appear in the form of national legislation and
executive branch positions taken in domestic litigation.
By far the most common evidence cited are ICJ judgments and national court
decisions, as well as the views expressed by state representatives during debates in the
Sixth Committee of the UNGA and other international forums. The Escobar Hernandez
Third Report provides an illustrative example. In considering evidence of how the term
“official” is defined in international law, the Report considers, in order, national judicial
practice, international judicial practice, treaty practice, and other works of the
Commission. 81 Of these, only treaty practice—listed third—is classic state practice
80
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geared towards foreign relations, although it may reveal little about whether the treaty has
passed into customary international law. 82
With respect to the views expressed by state representatives, these statements
might be considered a type of state practice, but their declarative content gives them
greater weight as opinio juris, although it is an opinio juris inflected through the
distinctive political environment of the international venues in which they are made and
the recognition by states of the legal value (or lack thereof) of such statements. In
addition, the extensive focus on methodological questions about codifying versus
progressively developing international law suggests a desire by ILC members to be
transparent about the Commission’s role as it prepares draft articles and other work
products for consideration by a wider community of actors.
In this way, the ILC’s recent work product reveals that a strong form of the
critique of customary international law is misguided—at least when applied to the
Commission. While existing CIL methodology may be imprecise relative to the clear
procedures that accompany treaty-making, institutions such as the ILC have an incentive
to clarify custom’s methodology as a way to increase their own influence. Indeed, the
ILC has undertaken this task with its ongoing project on the “Formation and evidence of
customary international/identification of customary international law.” 83 The outcome of
that process promises to limit, and by so limiting also expand, the ILC’s importance in a
post-treaty world.
The ILC faces a twin challenge. On the one hand, its influence likely requires
working with materials beyond the canonical approach to CIL that privileges the actions
and words of states. In a multipolar world, such inquiries will increasingly reveal sources
that are conflicting or unclear. On the other hand, the ILC must devise methodological
limits on its discretion to win acceptance for its more diverse work products. We
therefore expect the ILC to surrender voluntarily some amount of discretion as the price
of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of critical stakeholders, including the international
bar, international judges, NGOs, and IOs. A renewed dedication to methodology by the
ILC, in other words, functions as a costly commitment device. The ILC surrenders some
discretion in customary lawmaking in exchange for furthering the influence of its nontreaty outputs in shaping international law in the twenty-first century. In short, the
benefits of methodological constraints provide a reason internal to the operation of law—
and consistent with the Commission’s self-interest—for it to adhere to methodology.
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Of course, these arguments do not allow us to show empirically that the ILC is in
fact constrained by methodology. Our hope, however, is to test our hypothesis in future
work. The simultaneous consideration of foreign official immunity in the ILC and the
closely related topic of universal jurisdiction in the political Sixth Committee creates a
kind of natural experiment. If our hypothesis regarding methodology is correct, we would
expect the ILC, constrained to some degree by methodology, to reach different results
than the Sixth Committee.
Conclusion
The International Law Commission is an institution at a crossroads. Since the
1980s its tried-and-true method of lawmaking—preparing draft treaty articles that skirt
the line between codification and progressive development—has been stalled by gridlock
in the General Assembly. To reassert its influence, the Commission has increasingly
turned to non-binding codifications of customary international law. Yet since the legal
force of these non-binding codifications turns on their status and acceptance as CIL, the
methodology by which the ILC justifies its work has become increasingly important.
Methodology, in effect, confers a legitimacy on the Commission’s work product that the
political treaty-making process no longer can.
These shifts in the ILC’s practice may reflect larger trends in international
lawmaking. We therefore conclude this chapter with some preliminary reflections on the
generalizability of two aspects of our study: (1) the decline of broad-based multilateral
treaty-making, and (2) the distinction between lawmaking by political and expert bodies.
The General Assembly’s slow pace of treaty-making is in line with broader trends
in international lawmaking. On difficult issues ranging from climate change to closing
the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization, governments have been unable to
sustain the pace of multilateral lawmaking that characterized the second half of the
twentieth century. Indeed, in many issue areas lawmaking seems to be shifting to regional
fora. 84 This broader trend suggests that gridlock within the UNGA may not simply be a
reflection of “easy” topics having already been codified. Rather, it may indicate a more
fundamental breakdown of political consensus about critical legal issues, as well as a
destabilization of power relationships that have long shaped the international lawmaking
agenda.
The combination of these factors may have increased the transaction costs of
multilateral treaty-making to such a degree that states are forced to look for alternative
and less costly avenues of lawmaking, including soft law, customary international law,
international tribunals, and regional organizations. But if the General Assembly’s
gridlock is a symptom of these broader trends, further shifts in interstate power
relationships or the emergence of a new consensus on particular topics may reanimate the
UNGA. Our findings in this chapter suggest that, should these changes occur, the ILC
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will pivot back towards treaty-making, preferring the political endorsement of its work to
more amorphous and diverse pathways to legitimacy and acceptance.
The relationship between the UNGA and the ILC also highlights an increasingly
important distinction between expert and political bodies. Expert bodies like the ILC
have come to play an increasingly important role in lawmaking in recent decades. The
judicialization of some areas of international law is one manifestation of this trend. 85 In
other areas, however, intergovernmental institutions comprised of experts who generally
lack formal lawmaking authority have assumed a greater role in coordinating state
behavior and in laying the groundwork for interstate negotiations. Examples include the
International Renewable Energy Agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), or the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation
Protection. 86 Expert bodies differ from political bodies like the UNGA or diplomatic
conferences in that they generally operate by producing information—such as reports and
recommendations—rather than directly generating new legal rules. This information
often serves as the basis of subsequent international regulation.
The rise of expert bodies is often attributed to the increasing complexity of
international problems and their potential solutions. In responding to this complexity,
technocratic expertise may produce better governance outcomes than political bargaining.
Yet the relationships between political and expert bodies remain poorly understood. In
particular, we lack a well-developed account of whether delegating international
lawmaking—or governance functions more generally—to expert bodies like the ILC
produces different substantive outcomes or alters distributional issues. Questions to be
explored include the following: When and why do states delegate responsibility for
international governance to expert, as opposed to political, bodies? Do expert bodies that
operate under intergovernmental supervision produce systematically different results
from intergovernmental political bodies themselves? Are certain states systematically
advantaged by the use of expert bodies? What factors influence the decision to delegate
to one type of body or another? And what factors influence their effectiveness? Our study
of the ILC suggests that widespread political support for expert bodies may be a
sufficient but not a necessary condition for their effectiveness. Expert bodies will
continue to seek opportunities to influence the evolution of international law even in the
absence of a political consensus on the content of their work.
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